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Abstract
With the introduction of “strategic trade policy” in the 1980’s came two separate theoretical justifications for
increased government intervention to promote national industries: first, argued by Brander and Spencer
(1985), the government could alter the strategic interaction in oligopolistic competition to shift profits to a
domestic firm; second, the government could promote key industries in order to capture the benefits of
positive externalities, such as knowledge spillovers. But the creation of the WTO and the regulation of export
subsidies soon limited the strategic trade policy options available to governments. This paper examines the
case for providing R&D and capital subsidies to domestic firms as a kind of strategic trade policy in the
increasingly global economy of the 21st century.
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I - Introduction 
 
 When the concept of strategic trade policy was formulated in the 1980’s, deeply 
entrenched notions of the desirability of free trade were undermined as new applications of the 
models of imperfect competition seemed to justify increased government intervention.  There 
were two separate, but related theoretical justifications for the government to actively promote 
the interests of domestic firms.  The first, established by Brander and Spencer, argued that the 
government could alter the strategic interaction in oligopolistic competition to shift profits to a 
domestic firm.1  The second, borrowing from the economic development literature of the postwar 
period, suggested that the government could promote key industries in order to capture the 
benefits of positive externalities.2  In both cases, perceived market failures provided intellectual 
justification for the government to make a strategic choice to increase national welfare. 
With the creation of the WTO, however, the strategic choices available to governments 
were limited by regulations on export and domestic production subsidies, making what was once 
conceptually desirable as a strategic trade policy now rather impractical.  Current literature 
emphasizes that there still remains a scope for governments to use R&D subsidies to achieve 
both theoretical justifications for strategic trade policy.  While this kind of industrial policy as 
strategic trade policy is therefore theoretically alluring and practically feasible, in reality the 
benefits of R&D subsidies are likely to accrue to foreign as well as domestic firms.  Furthermore, 
since the rival promotion of national champions can lead to escalating costs and even all-out 
trade war, I argue that focusing on economic development fundamentals and perhaps 
maintaining a spirit of international cooperation remain the most viable strategies. 
                                                 
1 James A. Brander and Barbara J. Spencer, “Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry,” Journal of 
International Economics 18 (1985): 83-100. 
2 Paul Krugman, “Strategic Sectors and International Competition,” U.S. Trade Policies in a Changing World 
Economy, ed. Robert M. Stern.  (London: MIT Press, 1987) 221. 
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II – Brander and Spencer Revisited 
 Before showing how WTO regulations have limited the strategic choices available to 
governments, I will briefly outline the theoretical framework and practical limitations of the type 
of strategic trade policy proposed by Brander and Spencer.  Generally speaking, the importance 
of the Brander-Spencer argument for international trade theory is that it makes an exception to 
the rule of classical economics that export subsidies must decrease national welfare by lowering 
the terms-of-trade.  The model shows that in the case of duopoly competition between a domestic 
firm and a foreign rival in a third market, export subsidies can be used to encourage the domestic 
firm to increase production.   Because it is assumed that the firms are competing simultaneously 
in quantities, the foreign rival perceives the subsidy as a credible threat and will be forced to 
respond to the increased production by reducing its own output, thus allowing the domestic firm 
to capture market share.  This increased market share will translate in the form of increased 
profits for the domestic firm as well as greater domestic welfare if these profits turn out to be 
greater than the amount of the total export subsidy.3  Although the analysis is slightly more 
complicated for reciprocal competition in which each firm competes in each other’s home 
market, the “central game-theoretic insight” remains the same: governments can intervene as a 
third player to alter the strategic interaction between oligopolistic firms.4   
 The assumptions leading to this conclusion, however, have been challenged on a number 
of theoretical and practical grounds since it was first proposed.  First, the nature of the strategic 
interaction between firms is centrally important to the Brander-Spencer rationale, as a different 
assumption about the strategic variable can lead to a different conclusion about the optimal trade 
                                                 
3 James A. Brander and Barbara J. Spencer, “Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry,” Journal of 
International Economics 18 (1985): 83-100. 
4 James A. Brander, “Strategic Trade Policy,” Handbook of International Economics, eds. Gene M. Grossman and 
Kenneth Rogoff.  (New York: Elsevier, 1995) 1397. 
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policy.  As Grossman argues, an export tax turns out to be the best policy in the case of 
simultaneous price competition between the two firms.5  The reason is that competition in prices 
tends to lead both firms to produce too much output, and thus the profits of the domestic firm can 
be maximized if both governments impose an optimal export tax – or at least increased if the 
domestic government unilaterally imposes an export tax.  The problem for policymakers 
deciding whether an export tax or subsidy is the optimal policy, then, is to determine in which 
strategic variable, prices or quantities, the firms are actually competing.  Otherwise, the wrong 
judgment can lead to the enactment of a policy that is diametrically opposed to both the interests 
of the domestic firm and national welfare. 
 This brings up the second major objection against the Brander-Spencer argument, which 
is the practical difficulty of obtaining reliable information.  In deciding whether or not it is 
worthwhile to subsidize a domestic firm, it is critical for the government to have near-perfect 
information about the cost functions, expected payoffs, and strategic behavior of the domestic 
firm as well as the foreign rival.  Lacking this information, it is possible for a government to 
invest in a potentially disastrous and costly program of subsidies.  An early example of the 
possible pitfalls of strategic trade policy arising from the lack of precise information is the 
subsidization of the Airbus A300 versus the Boeing 767.  European governments gave Airbus an 
implicit subsidy in the form of a reduced-rate loan of approximately $1.5 billion in 1975 dollars, 
but Airbus ultimately ended up losing money on the launch of the A300.6  This kind of example 
shows that strategic trade policy does not always translate into instant returns for corporations or 
greater national welfare, but may in fact lead to losses by encouraging overproduction by the 
domestic firm or failing to discourage production by the foreign firm.  For this reason Grossman 
                                                 
5 Gene M. Grossman, “Strategic Export Promotion: A Critique,” Strategic Trade Policy and the New International 
Economics, ed. Paul R. Krugman.  (London: MIT Press, 1986) 54. 
6 “The economics of managed trade,” The Economist 9/22/90: 19-25. 
4
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 3 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol3/iss1/9
concluded as early as 1986, only one year after the introduction of the Brander-Spencer model, 
that “we do not now (and may never) have sufficient knowledge and information to merit the 
implementation of a policy of industrial targeting.”7
 Yet the argument that there are practical limitations to strategic trade policy does not 
necessarily reduce the theoretical attractiveness of the relatively simple conclusion reached by 
Brander and Spencer in their groundbreaking work.  As Brander argues, “the basic insight that 
strategic interaction between firms creates an opportunity for government action to modify the 
terms of that interaction is very robust.” The analysis can be adapted to provide for a wide range 
of policy instruments (tariffs, quotas, voluntary export restraints, and R&D subsidies) or 
different assumptions about which strategic variable the firms compete in (price, quantity, R&D, 
etc.).8  The point is that the Brander-Spencer model in export subsidies is just one example of 
several possible formulations of the strategic interaction between firms.  If governments are 
willing to risk proceeding without perfect information (which, I might add, they tend to do 
anyway), then they theoretically have any number of strategic variables to work with through 
trial and error to gain a competitive advantage for domestic firms in oligopolistic competition 
with foreign rivals. 
 But what is conceptually appealing is not always practically possible.  The real challenge 
to the type of strategic trade policy suggested by the Brander-Spencer analysis has been the 
imposition of international regulations which curtail the use of certain policy instruments.  The 
level of tariffs, for example, is bound by the commitments of individual countries that are 
annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  And non-
                                                 
7 Gene M. Grossman, “Strategic Export Promotion: A Critique,” Strategic Trade Policy and the New International 
Economics, ed. Paul R. Krugman.  (London: MIT Press, 1986) 48. 
8 James A. Brander, “Strategic Trade Policy,” Handbook of International Economics, eds. Gene M. Grossman and 
Kenneth Rogoff.  (New York: Elsevier, 1995) 1402. 
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tariff barriers, such as quotas and VER’s, have been restricted through the Agreement on Import 
Licensing Procedures.9  In regards to subsidies, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, explicitly prohibits subsidies which are contingent upon export performance.  Nearly 
all other firm or sector-specific subsidies are labeled as “actionable,” meaning that they are 
subject to retaliation if the complainant country can prove that the subsidy causes “injury” to its 
domestic industry or exhibits “serious prejudice” meant to displace its exports in the market of 
the subsidizing country or a third country.10  This has reduced the range of policies available for 
governments to affect the strategic interaction between firms – that is, without also facing the 
potential costs of countervailing measures if such subsidies are discovered.  On the other hand, 
subsidies for up to 75 percent of industrial research and 50 percent of precompetitive 
development activity are explicitly permitted by the WTO regulations.11  In other words, R&D 
and capital subsidies are still legitimate policy tools.  This allows a certain degree of latitude for 
governments to continue experimenting with strategic trade policy, albeit at a stage considerably 
further removed from the competitive game in prices or quantities originally proposed. 
 Spencer has actually shown that there are certain theoretical and practical advantages to 
considering the strategic interaction between firms as a three-stage process.  In this game, the 
firms begin with a simultaneous choice of R&D levels, then proceed to the second stage where 
each invests in productive capacity, and finally to price or quantity competition in the open 
market.12  It should be noted that this model helps to alleviate the concern that governments may 
not correctly assume the nature of the strategic interaction between firms (price or quantities) by 
                                                 
9 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO, World Trade Organization website, 19 December 2006.  
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/tif_e.htm>, 25, 49. 
10 World Trade Organization, “Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Overview,” World Trade Organization 
website, 19 December 2006, <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/subs_e.htm>. 
11 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack, Industrial Policy in an era of Globalization, (Washington: Institute for 
International Economics, 2003) 89. 
12 Paul Krugman, “Strategic Sectors and International Competition,” U.S. Trade Policies in a Changing World 
Economy, ed. Robert M. Stern.  (London: MIT Press, 1987) 213. 
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suggesting the more important competitive struggle may actually take place earlier in the game.  
If Spencer is correct, then the WTO regulations may actually benefit governments by limiting the 
number of strategic variables to the ones most likely to have the greatest impact on domestic 
competitiveness: R&D and capital development.  But as Krugman points out, Spencer’s 
recommendation that strategic trade policies target these variables instead of affecting trade 
flows directly essentially “amounts to saying that competitive policy should be industrial policy 
rather than trade policy.”13  For better or worse, then, the realm of strategic trade policy has 
returned to the field of industrial theory upon which it was founded, leaving us to seek out our 
answers there. 
III-Externalities and Industrial Policy 
 It is with this point in mind that I turn to the second justification for strategic trade policy, 
which is the idea that certain key industries exhibit positive externalities that should be promoted 
by the government to increase national welfare.  Although Brander implies that this kind of 
policy is not properly “strategic” because it does not condition or alter a strategic relationship 
between firms,14 most of the literature considers it under the same heading as “strategic trade 
policy,” and not without reason.  In this case, the government still acts strategically, but under 
the pretext of competing with other countries to promote industries in which the social benefits 
of output are not entirely represented in private returns.  The concern here is that the benefits to 
national welfare of these externalities will be lost if a government does not act strategically to 
ensure that such industries are located within the country’s borders.  It is important to note that 
this is differs from the “infant industry” argument, which I will not consider here, because the 
goal is to ensure that established and sizeable firms in these industries do not relocate abroad for 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 James A. Brander, “Strategic Trade Policy,” Handbook of International Economics, eds. Gene M. Grossman and 
Kenneth Rogoff.  (New York: Elsevier, 1995) 1397. 
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whatever reason (reduced costs, lower taxes, etc.) rather shelter smaller, developing sectors from 
foreign competition. 
 Krugman suggests that there is a convincing economic rationale behind these concerns 
which can be illustrated by the example of externalities arising from knowledge spillovers.  
While there exist other possible causes of technological and linkage externalities, the generation 
of knowledge is a particularly useful target because it is “an activity unlikely to be rewarded at 
its marginal social productivity.”  Patents and other intellectual property rights are meant to 
ensure that the developers of knowledge benefit from their ideas at least for a time, but such 
instruments are by no means perfect and cannot completely prevent what one firm learns through 
experience or R&D from being appropriated by another firm.15  Because the social benefits of 
the knowledge generated are not fully represented in private returns, there is a role for the 
government to provide subsidies that encourage R&D.  Carried to its full conclusion, this would 
suggest that the best policy is to subsidize all firms that engage in the generation of knowledge in 
order to ensure that the socially optimal level of research is achieved and national welfare is 
maximized.  Furthermore, if foreign promotion of such knowledge-generating sectors is 
occurring, then subsidization appears to be particularly crucial as the home country may be 
deprived of valuable spillovers if the government fails to counteract the advantages granted to 
foreign firms.16
This logic assumes, however, that the external benefits of generating knowledge can be 
internalized within a country’s physical borders, which is not always the case.  As Krugman 
points out, it is useful to think about an “idealized thee-part scheme” when considering what 
                                                 
15 Paul Krugman, “Strategic Sectors and International Competition,” U.S. Trade Policies in a Changing World 
Economy, ed. Robert M. Stern.  (London: MIT Press, 1987) 221. 
16 Paul Krugman, “Introduction: New Thinking about Trade Policy,” Strategic Trade Policy and the New 
International Economics, ed. Paul R. Krugman.  (London: MIT Press, 1986) 14. 
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kinds of knowledge firms may generate: (1) knowledge that can be appropriated within the firm, 
(2) knowledge that diffuses beyond the firm but stays within national boundaries, and (3) 
knowledge that becomes easily available internationally once it is generated.17  It is only in the 
second case that there exists a possible strategic rationale for the government to promote a 
particular sector.  In the first case, the knowledge will be represented in the private returns of 
each firm.  In the third case, it would be in the interest of a global government to promote the 
generation of such knowledge in order to increase global welfare, but obviously no such 
government entity yet exists. 
Despite this major caveat, this model is useful because it allows us to think about what 
scope remains for a strategic trade policy based upon capturing knowledge spillovers for the 
domestic economy.  As in the first formulation of strategic trade policy, the WTO regulations on 
the use of certain policy instruments reduce the strategic options available to governments to 
achieve this end.  But there still remain the policy tools of R&D subsidies and capital subsidies.  
These can be employed to correct the failure of the market to appropriate the external benefits of 
knowledge generation to individual firms.  R&D and even capital subsidies are more appropriate 
policies anyway because they more directly address this market failure, whereas export or 
domestic production subsidies are only second-best policies.  Yet, the use of R&D and capital 
subsidies as a kind of strategic trade policy does not seem to have much to do with trade at all, or 
at least not directly.  Therefore, at the risk of parsing words, we may conclude that so-called 
“strategic trade policy” in each of its formulations has been reduced to industrial policy which is 
calculated to improve the international competitiveness of domestic firms. 
 
                                                 
17 Paul Krugman, “Strategic Sectors and International Competition,” U.S. Trade Policies in a Changing World 
Economy, ed. Robert M. Stern.  (London: MIT Press, 1987) 222. 
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IV-Potential Pitfalls 
Is this kind of industrial policy as strategic trade policy an efficient one for governments 
to pursue in a global economy?  Will it increase national welfare?  The answer, of course, 
depends upon which government.  I will focus on countries that are both members of the WTO 
and largely industrialized.  Such countries are constrained in regards to the policy options 
available to them due to general WTO regulations as well as the more stringent rules that apply 
to developed countries, allowing us to simplify the normative analysis.  But my central policy 
recommendations will be important for all nations to consider because, generally speaking, 
industrial policy is not the right answer for improving international competitiveness.  Even 
treating industrial policy on its own terms by ignoring the informational difficulties of picking 
“winners,” there are a number of theoretical and practical limitations to its application as a 
strategic trade policy.  First, in all likelihood the benefits of R&D subsidies are likely to accrue 
to foreign rivals as well as domestic firms.  Second, empirical studies have shown that targeted 
industrial promotion is not particularly beneficial to national welfare.  Finally, the rival 
promotion of national champions may negate the potential benefits of such policies.  All of these 
complications are related to the fact that tools of industrial policy are not particularly effective in 
a global economy. 
 Returning to Krugman’s simplified model of knowledge spillovers, it becomes apparent 
that R&D subsidies to domestic firms are just as likely to benefit foreign rivals if we assume that 
most of the knowledge generated is the kind that becomes available internationally.  In this age 
of telecommunications and low transportation costs, with multinational firms operating across 
the globe, the economic boundaries of the state have in many ways withered away.  This 
changing economic landscape makes it difficult to continue to justify the assumption that the 
10
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knowledge generated by firms represents an externality that is internalized within the physical 
boundaries of the state.  Without this assumption, however, it is difficult to justify the 
implementation of an R&D subsidy to achieve either goal of strategic trade policy, whether the 
government is attempting to capture rents from a foreign rival or the positive externalities of a 
strategic sector.  As Spencer concedes, a domestic firm is only a good candidate for an R&D 
subsidy if “there is a minimum spillover of new domestic technology to rival firms.”18  This is 
problematic because it is likely to be more difficult now to find industries that exhibit such a 
“minimum spillover” than ever.  If this is the case, then a subsidy which cannot be fully 
appropriated by domestic firms essentially represents a gift to rival foreign firms at the expense 
of domestic taxpayers. 
 In regards to the effectiveness of sector-specific subsidies in general, Noland and Pack 
conclude in their study of the so-called “Asian Miracle” that targeted industrial policy was only 
marginally beneficial to the rates of growth of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.  Specifically, the 
authors found that total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates did not support the theory of early 
postwar advocates of industrialization that “the entire manufacturing sector, and perhaps the 
entire economy, is the beneficiary of widely diffused external economies.”  Instead, the TFP 
growth which did occur within individual sectors was explained by more conventional 
explanations such as learning-by-doing and the importation of foreign technology at the level of 
the individual firm.19  This last point, particularly, should give us pause.  For contrary to the oft-
proposed notion that “countries are better able to apply new technology if the technology is 
                                                 
18 Barbara J. Spencer, “What should trade policy target?” Strategic Trade Policy and the New International 
Economics, ed. Paul R. Krugman.  (London: MIT Press, 1986) 79. 
19 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack, Industrial Policy in an era of Globalization, (Washington: Institute for 
International Economics, 2003) 96. 
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developed at home,”20 this is evidence that individual firms can indeed succeed in the application 
of technology – and by extension, knowledge – which has been developed abroad.  Therefore, 
the importance of industrial policy for promoting the development of specific sectors vis-à-vis 
foreign rivals is not entirely clear, as individual firms appear entirely capable of adopting foreign 
technology and appropriating it for their own benefit. 
Furthermore, Noland and Pack suggest that a large part of the success of Japan, Korea, 
and Taiwan can be attributed to good macroeconomic policy, such as low government deficits, 
stable real exchange rates, and low rates of inflation.  While these measures in themselves do not 
guarantee increased national welfare, they may lead to high rates of saving and investment 
which, in combination with government spending on higher education and basic infrastructure, 
as well as “a favorable attitude toward international technology transfer,” can create the proper 
conditions for growth.21  In this same vein, broader measures to encourage general research have 
actually proven to be more successful at developing strategic sectors than subsidies aimed 
specifically at a certain industry.  Beginning in 1960, the US and Germany began investing large 
amounts of money in biotechnology, but by 1997 the US biotechnology sector was ten times 
larger than that of Germany.  The most important factor in determining US success was that US 
subsidies for basic research allowed for “organic development” of the industry while German 
pharmaceutical firms were faced with “weak incentives in the university system to transform 
basic research into patentable innovations.”22  Thus, the empirical evidence shows that a return to 
the fundamentals of growth and economic development could be far more beneficial than the 
                                                 
20 Paul Krugman, “Strategic Sectors and International Competition,” U.S. Trade Policies in a Changing World 
Economy, ed. Robert M. Stern.  (London: MIT Press, 1987) 229. 
21 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack, Industrial Policy in an era of Globalization, (Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 2003) 100-101. 
22 Steven McGuire, “No more euro-champions?  The interaction of EU industrial and trade policies,” Journal of 
European Public Policy 13:6 (September 2006) 887-905. 
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sophisticated targeting of industrial policy.  But, perhaps more importantly, there is an indication 
that R&D subsidies may be most effective precisely when they are in fact the least strategic: by 
promoting general research in universities where the benefits of generated knowledge are 
practically open to everyone, domestically and internationally. 
 In addition to these potential pitfalls of employing industrial policy as strategic trade 
policy, intense rivalry between countries to promote the interests of national champions can 
negate the potential benefits of subsidization.  Busch has created a model which shows how this 
may occur, but it reflects his optimism that all-out trade war can be avoided.  The central 
argument is that governments will fight for domestic firms in industries exhibiting external 
benefits and fight harder when these benefits are internalized nationally, but then seek to ease 
tensions when both sides are made worse-off.23  In order to justify this conclusion, Busch 
simplifies the strategic calculus of the state by creating two binary independent variables: the 
first describes whether or not the economy is capable of utilizing the externalities, while the 
second indicates whether or not these externalities are contained strictly within national 
boundaries.  This, of course, is a vast oversimplification, but it allows Busch to model the 
qualitative differences in the strategic trade policies between states for three separate case 
studies: the US-Europe civil aircraft rivalry, the US-Japan semiconductor rivalry, and the US-
Japan HDTV rivalry. 
 For the purposes of our analysis, the first case is the most significant because it suggests 
the optimistic scenario in which both sides reach the brink of a trade war, but still find a way to 
reach a mutually beneficial compromise that limits subsidization.  According to Busch’s 
argument, the civil aircraft industry exhibits externalities which are internalized within national 
                                                 
23 Marc L. Busch, Trade Warriors: States, Firms, and Strategic-Trade Policy in High-Technology Competition, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 12. 
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borders, making each government particularly desirous of subsidizing its national champion to 
capture these benefits for national welfare.24  This dynamic, however, leads to a situation in 
which both sides are made worse off due to overproduction, creating an incentive to enter into an 
agreement to reduce subsidies.  In this case, Europe and the US were able to achieve the Large 
Civil Aircraft (LCA) Agreement in 1992, which essentially sought to limit overspending by each 
government and reduce international rivalry to achieve a Pareto-superior outcome.  Busch 
recognizes the apparent difficulty of maintaining such a negotiated equilibrium when each 
government still has an incentive to renege on its promise25, but the real problem is that his 
model is too simple.   
 As Goldstein and McGuire point out, the model cannot explain why the trade conflict 
between Brazil and Canada in the regional aircraft industry has not led to a similar mutually 
beneficial compromise.26  As Busch concedes, his treatment of the state as a rational unitary 
actor has forced him to pay “little attention to the domestic politics of strategic trade.”27  In their 
account, on the other hand, Goldstein and McGuire attempt to account for interest group politics, 
the importance of ideas, and the impact of international institutions on the perpetuation of the 
Brazil-Canada trade conflict.  The basic explanation provided is that the governments of Brazil 
and Canada, influenced by powerful lobbies, have deemed that the stakes are too high to reduce 
subsidies and risk losing the international competitiveness of their flagship corporations when 
there is no guarantee that the other party will follow suit.  Instead of arguing this is evidence that 
the regulations and oversight mechanisms of the WTO need to be increased, however, Goldstein 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 37. 
25 Ibid. 59-60. 
26 Andrea E. Goldstein and Steven M. McGuire, “The Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy and the Brazil-
Canada Export Subsidies Saga,” The World Economy 27.4 (April 2004): 541-566. 
27 Marc L. Busch, Trade Warriors: States, Firms, and Strategic-Trade Policy in High-Technology Competition, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 147. 
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and McGuire suggest that the automatic dispute settlement process may actually make “a 
resolution of the dispute more difficult by dramatically increasing the cost of losing.”28  Because 
the governments are not able to enter into a private negotiated settlement, the conflict has 
become protracted as neither side can seem to find a politically viable way of backing down. 
V-Conclusion 
 If we accept this conclusion, then it seems that even in the case of R&D subsidies it is 
possible that everyone can lose, as the competitive ethos may lead to increasingly drastic steps to 
stay ahead of the competition, thus reducing the profitability of both firms and undermining the 
basic principles of negotiation and the rules-based system upon which the WTO was founded.  
Yet, as the analysis by Noland and Peck of the “Asian Miracle” illustrates, it is not even entirely 
clear that targeted industrial policy is a useful way of increasing international competitiveness of 
domestic firms or sparking growth.  Instead, it has been shown that a policy of openness to the 
adoption of foreign technology and the encouragement of general research may be the keys to 
success when they are combined with the appropriate macroeconomic policies.  This arises from 
the fact that, in the global economy, the external benefits of knowledge generated at the level of 
the firm or industry are difficult to contain within national boundaries even despite international 
agreements on intellectual property rights.  Therefore, the use of R&D subsidies as a tool for 
shifting rents from foreign rivals or capturing positive externalities is particularly dubious as a 
strategic trade policy; if such a policy does not actually decrease national welfare by helping 
rival firms at the expense of domestic taxpayers or sparking retaliation from foreign 
governments, then it is at least likely to be rather ineffective. 
                                                 
28 Andrea E. Goldstein and Steven M. McGuire, “The Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy and the Brazil-
Canada Export Subsidies Saga,” The World Economy 27.4 (April 2004): 541-566. 
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 I have argued that there is not a strong case for governments to employ industrial policy 
as a kind of strategic trade policy in today’s economy.  Yet there are certain questions that 
remain which I have not been able to fully cover within the scope of this paper.  First, I have 
suggested that targeted industrial policy is not generally effective in comparison with broader-
based policies meant to promote macroeconomic stability, basic infrastructure, and innovation.  
But it is not entirely clear that the use of targeted capital subsidies suffers from all the same 
drawbacks as targeted R&D subsidies given that the goal is the development of capital capacity 
rather than knowledge.  Second, and on a more positive note, I have concluded that a policy of 
openness to the use of foreign technology, rather than a strict emphasis on developing and 
applying “home-grown” knowledge, can be highly beneficial to growth.  But more research 
needs to be done on whether this open-sourcing of knowledge in a spirit of international 
cooperation might represent a more viable “strategic trade policy” than the nationalistic policies 
attempted thus far which tend only to spark intense rivalry and bitter competition. 
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